

It Was *Always* Blood and Soil: Ecofascism and the Racial Capitalocene

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Abstract: In this article, we reconceptualise ecofascism by tracing its roots back to their colonial origin, and in doing so provide firmer ground on which to confront it. First, we outline contemporary literature on ecofascism and isolate three areas of confusion: the actions that constitute it, the most relevant actors, and the theoretical genealogy that best explains it. Second, we offer our own conception of ecofascism by reading Aimé Césaire's conception of fascism as colonial categories and tactics that "boomerang" back into the colonial core alongside the "racial capitalocene" framework. This juxtaposition illuminates colonialism and ecofascism as inextricably interconnected phenomena. Thus, we reconceive of ecofascism as the culmination of the colonial logics of extractivism, dehumanisation, and racialised violence finally made legible to and felt by the colonial core. Finally, we articulate forms of confrontation that contest the conditions of possibility for ecofascism as such.

Keywords: ecofascism, colonialism, race, capitalocene, genocide, violence

"...whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever, Amen!"—W.E.B. Du Bois, *Darkwater* (2016 [1920])

Introduction

Over the last half decade, ecofascism has quickly become a household word. Largely in response to a rash of mass shootings by self-identified ecofascists, think-pieces and explainers hoping to define this emergent threat began to appear in droves. Divided in their various stories—is ecofascism when environmentalists become fascists, or when fascists coopt the environment?—these articles rightly identified that a warming planet would only exacerbate the conditions under which ecofascist violence becomes more commonplace. Scholars too have begun to sound the alarm: mobilising working groups, organising conferences, and christening a quickly expanding body of literature in response to the widespread anxiety that ecofascism is around the corner. And yet, contemporary

scholarship's analysis of ecofascism is fractured at best, and contradictory and self-defeating at worst. Here, we set out to reconceptualise ecofascism by tracing its roots back to their colonial origin and in doing so provide firmer ground on which to confront it.

This article proceeds in three broad sections. In the first, we outline the contemporary scholarship on ecofascism and in doing so thematise its various contradictions and confusions. We highlight its disagreement about which actions are considered most relevant to ecofascism (mass shootings, anti-immigrant policies, etc.), which actors we should focus on (demagogic politicians, far-right parties, mass shooters, etc.), and which theoretical or ideological genealogy best helps us understand ecofascism. Such descriptive confusion implies important theoretical tensions: ecofascism's relationship to race (internal or incidental?) and capitalism (endemic or unrelated?), for instance, are still unsettled in the literature. Because of this, the various prescriptions offered by scholars who interrogate ecofascism span impressively, ranging from re-commitment to democratic norms to eco-Nuremberg trials to proletarian revolution.

The second section offers our own conception of ecofascism. We begin by invoking Martinican poet and philosopher Aimé Césaire's conception of fascism as a "boomerang": that the horrors of the Holocaust are no aberration from modern notions of historical progress, but rather the culmination of capitalistic and racist logics forged, practised, and perfected in the crucible of colonialism. By reading Césaire's account of colonialism alongside Kathryn Yusoff's, Françoise Vergès', and Farhana Sultana's explanations of the imbrication of racial categories and proximity to nature (or the inhuman), we contend that ecofascism is likewise a culmination of the intersecting logics of colonialism and the intentional overlap in definitions of biological race and nature. While some of the literature surveyed in the first section understands this to some extent—that ecofascism's motivating logics are internal to liberal capitalism, or are traceable back to the way that European colonisers dispossessed Native Americans of their land—we argue that these accounts do not go far enough. Both liberalism and frontier-ist colonial genocide are part of a broader project outlined by decolonial thinkers and those who write about the racial capitalocene: that ecologically imbricated violence had its beginning in the long 16th century, rather than in the 18th century with the industrial revolution or the 20th or 21st centuries seemingly out of nowhere. Tactics and political forms associated with ecofascism—racist dehumanisation, expulsion or violence on the grounds of "nativity" or "indigeneity", the borders and nation-states that structure these acts and the conceptions of citizenship that justify them, etc.—are not *new* in some way, but rather are foundational to the Western colonial project and its attendant racial capitalism. An implication of this analysis, then, is that ecofascism is not "on the horizon"; rather, Western capitalist modernity has *always* relied on ecofascist violence. In other words, it was *always* blood and soil.

The third section brings this analysis to bear on contemporary praxis. We begin by posing the question: if those working in the traditions of decolonial theory and the racial capitalocene give us the most theoretical insight into the logic and violence of ecofascism, why does discourse about ecofascism predominantly exist

outside of these spaces? The answer, in short, is a question of temporality, privilege, and culpability. As scholars and writers like Kyle Whyte, N.K. Jemisin, and Saidiya Hartman have argued, the Western fascination with the post-apocalyptic is a position only available to those who haven't yet experienced apocalypse. In our context, what some have called the "'ecofascist hypothesis': the widespread anxiety that our political future might be 'ecofascism'" (Moore and Roberts 2022:5) is a theoretical fear only available to a privileged few. The enunciation of ecofascism already betrays the logics traced here: one can only speak of ecofascism as a mounting *future* threat if they are positioned racially, geographically, economically, and temporally furthest from colonial violence. This vantage point helps us to understand better what can and must be done: if ecofascism operates on the basis of colonial logics, we have much in the way of post-/de-/anti-colonial thinking on what is required in order to build coalitions across difference capable of resisting and overcoming it. If we do not link ecofascism to the colonial project, however, we run the risk of re-creating the white man's burden in administering ways to address this violence. In order to avoid responses to ecofascism that leave its conditions of possibility intact, our understanding of ecofascism and responses to it must begin with those logics and their origin some half a millennia ago.

Multi-Form Ecofascism(s): Themes and Tensions in the Literature

The category of ecofascism is not new. For decades, the term has been mobilised sporadically by thinkers from across the political spectrum. In the 1980s, for instance, Marxist anarchist and social ecologist Murray Bookchin (1987) famously condemned Arne Naess' formulation of deep ecology as ecofascist for suggesting that instead of doing things like sending aid to Ethiopia or welcoming immigrants from Latin America, humanity should "let nature seek its own balance". On the other hand, ecofascism has served as a continuous bogeyman for those on the right; a book by James Delingpole (2013) tellingly titled *The Little Green Book of Eco-Fascism* exemplifies the conservative urge to smear climate activism and regulation as ecofascist. In the last decade, however, a scholarly literature on ecofascism has begun to grow in its own right, no doubt in response to some combination of the increasingly dire climate situation and a spate of self-identified ecofascist acts of violence. Unfortunately, this burgeoning discourse remains fractured along numerous fault lines, and subsequently there is currently no real agreement on what constitutes ecofascism as such. Here, we survey the literature along three axes of disagreement: the actions that constitute ecofascism, the actors most relevant to ecofascism, and the theoretical genealogy that best explains ecofascism.

Almost every recent account of ecofascism mentions at least one of three instances of mass violence: the March 2019 Christchurch shooting in which a gunman entered two mosques and murdered 51 people as they observed Friday prayer; the August 2019 El Paso shooting in which a shooter killed 23 people as they went about their business in a local Walmart; or the May 2022 Buffalo

shooting in which a gunman took the lives of 10 people shopping at a supermarket. The three perpetrators self-identified as “eco-fascist” either in their manifestos or online posts, which in their understanding defends nature against the environmental and cultural “degradation” purportedly brought on by specific populations.¹ The racial and xenophobic dimensions of this ostensibly ecologically oriented violence are clear: beyond each gunman’s invocations of white supremacy, the victims of the Christchurch shooting were all Muslim, the victims of the El Paso shooting predominantly Latino, and the victims of the Buffalo shooting all Black. From these events, scholars have gleaned the obvious continuities: that self-described ecofascism is expressly white supremacist, ethno-nationalist, and mobilises the language of environmental protection as an added dimension to conspiracy theories such as the Great Replacement (Heino 2024; Moore and Roberts 2022; Richards et al. 2022; Satgar 2021b; Sipe 2023). In this way, these eco-fascist shootings are legible in the context of a larger network of white supremacist conspiracy theorising, including the 2011 mass shooting in Norway that left 69 dead (Ross and Bevensee 2020:17).

Beyond these obvious and egregious flashpoints of ecofascist violence, however, there is less agreement on what actions deserve to be considered ecofascist. The next most commonly associated actions come in the form of xenophobic anti-immigrant policies, including the Islamophobic measures proposed by Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the Netherlands’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) and Forum voor Democratie (FvD), and France’s Front National (FN), among others.² Andreas Malm and the Zetkin Collective (2021:39) sum up the relationship at play between the climate and immigration: “every time a European far-right party denies or downplays climate change, it makes a statement about immigration. It says: the problem facing our societies has nothing to do with climate—forget about that hoax—the real danger is the presence of too many non-white foreigners and, to be precise, too many Muslims in our land”. Illustrating this diagnosis perfectly, former AfD party leader Alexander Gauland laughed off the reality of climate-induced flooding, opting instead to include in a 2016 speech that “I do not want to live in a country where Muslims have the majority ... This is, dear friends, a policy of *human flooding*” (Gauland 2016).

There is, however, already tension between these two types of ecofascistic actions: whereas the shooters described above are ecofascist on account of their affirmatively invoking purportedly environmental concerns to justify violence, these xenophobic policies demonstrate ecofascist tendencies by virtue of their *denial* of the climate crisis in combination with the racist rhetoric and violence they perpetuate. Even so, scholars have rightly connected both of these kinds of actions through their shared characterisation of non-white folks. As Graham Lawton (2019:24) points out, both sorts of actions demonise immigrants while absolving the “native population” from blame (environmental, moral, or otherwise). Moreover, even though far-right political parties couch their xenophobia in climate denial, the connective currents of conspiracy theories like the Great Replacement still exhibit ecofascist tendencies insofar as they bind immigration and environmental degradation in violent extremists’ eyes: according to Escobar Fernández and Hart (2023), “immigrants are perceived by eco-fascists as parasites

in their ecosystems that are stopping nature from recovering its state of harmony and strength". Drawing these currents together, Kristy Campion (2023:927) has defined ecofascism as "a reactionary and revolutionary ideology that champions the regeneration of an imagined community through a return to a romanticised, ethnopluralist vision of the natural order". While these continuities do afford us insight into the connections between these actions as they relate to race, the relationship between the "eco" and "fascism" of ecofascism is still underdetermined. Is the "natural order" in Campion's definition one that references climate crises and defines that order as slowing global warming? Or is the "natural order" a denialist position that relegates climate discourse in toto to ostensible *left-wing* "ecofascism"? Connected though both these sorts of actions are, their juxtaposition obscures what makes ecofascism deserving of its name.

As a consequence of the fragmented and at times contradictory actions noted above, the literature likewise exhibits some confusion over which actors are most relevant to ecofascism. Even though the mass murderers from Christchurch and El Paso are referenced frequently, little research focuses specifically on these mass shooters. Instead, scholars tend to emphasise two different groups of actors: the first of which are the far-right parties detailed above. Escobar Fernández and Hart (2023) explain that whether or not "eco-populist radical right parties" exist is not in question; rather, *how* they incorporate ecopopulist discourses into their rhetoric and policy is an ongoing debate. While Malm and the Zetkin Collective's position is that far-right parties proceed by climate denial, Forchtner and Kølvråa (2015) argue that some parties' invocation of the environment is ambivalent. France's Front National's "patriotic ecology", for example, aims to "protect" the environment against things like energy policies and green energy, effectively landing somewhere between climate change awareness and denial (Forchtner and Kølvråa 2015). In any case, these analyses locate far-right parties as the most important intersection of ecofascist ideology and political power.

The second group of actors that frequently appear in analyses of ecofascism are the members of online ecofascist and neo-Nazi communities and forums. William Sipe (2023:2, 93) contends that it is through these networks that ecofascism as an affirmative identity is cultivated: Brenton Tarrant (the Christchurch shooter) posted his manifesto entitled *The Great Replacement* online, referencing Anders Breivik's 2011 manifesto and mass murder campaign as an influence. After the Christchurch shooting, Tarrant was canonised by community members as "Saint Tarrant", and portions of his manifesto appeared word-for-word in Payton Gendron's own manifesto posted shortly before his Buffalo attack. These online networks proliferate through a host of different outlets, including 4chan, Twitch, Discord, Kiwi Farms, Gab, and Telegram, making the decentralisation of ecofascist ideology especially worrisome (Cohen and Decker 2022). Richards et al. (2022:23) identify particular online spaces as crucial to the development of ecofascist rhetoric and its intersection with far-right conspiracy theorising. Their own analysis isolates Stormfront, the "first dedicated online white nationalist media platform", as a "potential future avenue for the mainstreaming of eco-fascist ideation".

Once more, while these two broad groups are related by virtue of their proximity to xenophobic and white supremacist conspiracy theories, each actor's salience

is directly related to which actions each respective scholar defines as ecofascist. While some scholars, such as Sam Moore and Alex Roberts, split the difference by simply listing far-right parties, younger (online) far-right and fascist movements, and ecofascist terrorists under the banner of ecofascism as a “present political form” (Moore and Roberts 2022:5), there still remains divisions in the literature over which actors are most deserving of the title “ecofascist”, and therefore to whom we should pay most attention.

Underlying both of these descriptive tensions is a fundamental theoretical disagreement. Recent scholarship on ecofascism traces its genealogy to at least four different historical and material contexts, each of which implies a significantly different conception of the phenomenon. Some portray ecofascism as an all-new formation (see e.g. Lawton 2019), which implies that its genesis is a product of recent climate change anxieties and longstanding racism. Whether these “anxieties” are earnest or strategic does not seem to matter—that climate change *can* be leveraged as a threat is what makes this combination possible. More common, however, are treatments of ecofascism that trace its emergence to past historical contexts. Both Huq and Mochida (2018) and Escobar Fernández and Hart (2023) cite the Wise Use movement—a loose coalition of American libertarians, populists, conservatives, and other small government and private property supporters—as typifying modern ecofascism. In this context, ecofascism is only about four decades old, and should include events like the 2016 occupation of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge led by Ammon Bundy. Though the connection to Western propertarian understandings of land is relevant to ecofascism, other aspects of this genealogy are more complicating than illuminating: despite the fact that Bundy’s defence of “the people” implies rural white Americans’ right to private property, he has also gone on record criticising the Trump administration and expressing measured support for Black Lives Matter vis-à-vis the police state (Bernstein 2020). In these regards, this genealogy conflates a libertarian movement with ecofascism’s ultranationalism, which results in confusions about whether politicians like Donald Trump are primary actors of ecofascism or its opponents, and how race fits into the ideology.

Malm and the Zetkin Collective (2021:398), as well as Ross and Bevensee (2020:4), locate the origins of ecofascism earlier with the onset of fascism in Europe. Tracing these lines through the obviously related invocation of “blood and soil” by the National Socialists, this genealogy more neatly explains contemporary ecofascist discourse in its outwardly violent and politically xenophobic forms, especially insofar as they both seek a white ethnostate free of a racialised Other. At the same time, this account emphasises some important differences: because European fascism was born through combustion, fossil fuels, and a veneration of industry/the “machine” over nature, Malm and the Zetkin Collective claim that ecologically justified fascistic violence cannot properly be called “ecofascism” unless it *actually* seeks climate mitigation and breaks from fossil capital. Thus, their genealogy draws a distinction between “fossil fascism” and ecofascism, which are at odds precisely because the latter requires an earnest commitment to climate mitigation that is anathema to the former. However, this move only introduces new confusions and complexities: not only do other scholars surveyed here

describe ecofascism as precisely what Malm and the Zetkin Collective call fossil fascism, but such a distinction obscures the considerable continuities between the two categories. If both, for instance, invoke the Great Replacement and the need to restore natural order as justification for xenophobic policy and racist violence, then they rely on the same conditions of possibility regardless of their presentation. Likewise, while it is simple in principle to distinguish between pollution via fossil fuels and climate mitigation tactics, it is far less clear that this distinction illuminates the many conflicting and overlapping far-right characterisations of the “nature” they seek to protect (e.g. environmental systems or a nostalgised *Lebensraum* free of immigrants and wind farms) as well as how to do so (e.g. through actual climate mitigation or by rolling back green energy initiatives, which it regards as left-wing ecofascism). Nevertheless, this genealogy correctly implies that fascism has always incorporated environmental “concerns” into its justifications for racial violence, despite its downside of implying that the intersection of environmentally justified mass violence and race began only in the early 20th century.

Here, yet others draw connections between contemporary ecofascism and 19th century Westward expansion in the United States. Vishwas Satgar (2021b:27) rightly connects the white nativist nationalism of European fascism to the late 19th century, “when conservationists believed that race purity was also about purity of the land, and hence Native Americans could not be part of conservation of spaces”. Efadul Huq and Henry Mochida (2018) connect their own account of ecofascism’s genealogy by explaining that the Malheur standoff and Wise Use movement trace their “roots to the Jeffersonian Westward Expansion”. In the same way, Moore and Roberts (2022:21) single out Madison Grant as a key American figure in “early twentieth-century far-right ecologism”, citing his influence on displacing Indigenous Americans in order to construct the National Parks, generating racist US immigration policy, and supporting American eugenics research. Though widespread racial violence justified through ostensible protection or conservation of a white ethnostate connects ecofascism with the late 19th century in America, these scholars refrain—confusingly—from employing the word ecofascism to interrogate the era, opting instead for the language of “echoes”, shared commitments, or influences on contemporary eco-fascism.

These genealogical disagreements, then, underscore a further temporal uncertainty: do the actions above constitute ecofascism “proper”, or is “actually existing” ecofascism a future threat? While scholars are generally comfortable distinguishing between ecofascism as an ideology and the ecofascist acts of violence chronicled above, at least two book-length treatments of ecofascism ultimately render it a future spectre. Malm and the Zetkin Collective (2021:476) argue that a fully-fledged ecofascism would require a profound break with what they call fossil fascism, but that Austrian conservatives who pushed for 100% green energy and a full ban on hijabs in 2020 represented the real possibility. Likewise, Moore and Roberts (2022: Chapter 4) relegate ecofascism “proper” to a future possibility, opting instead to describe current violence as mere “far right ecologism”. In their view, the unfolding of the climate crisis is too complex to forecast whether fossil capital will continue unabated, a chic green capitalism will

emerge, or if humanity will dissolve into the deadly violence of “climate collapse cults”. Once more, the questions of who and what constitute ecofascism—and whether or not we are currently experiencing it—loom large.

The combination of these disagreements about relevant actions, important actors, and ecofascism’s genealogy betray a general confusion about ecofascism as such. For instance, how do we understand the relationship between “eco” and “fascism”? If we prioritise the former, ecofascism is a green that turns brown: we would therefore understand ecofascism as the culmination of the already racist American conservationist movements of the 19th century and the ostensibly progressive prescriptions of mid-20th century environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich, Arne Naess, and the writers of *Earth First!* If we prioritise the latter, ecofascism is a brown that turns green: we would then conceptualise ecofascism as a culmination of European fascism’s internal logics, with environmental peril becoming more salient as global warming’s destruction becomes more evident.

What’s more, ecofascism’s logical relationship to race and capitalism is left ambivalent in the literature above. While these studies generally identify that race and class are vectors along which harms occur, they largely do not interrogate race and class as conditions of possibility for ecofascism in the first place.³ In other words, in the analyses above violence emanates from bad actors rather than the logics that make race and class particularly susceptible—or even possible. For this reason, the scholars above offer a wide array of prescriptions for confronting the *symptoms* of ecofascism. Moore and Roberts (2022:130–131), for instance, prescribe solidarity and anti-fascism in the face of ecofascism. While technically true, this position only begs the question. Among the other recommendations are reliance on “something akin to a climate justice version of the Nuremberg trials” (Satgar 2021b:43), a sanctions regime modelled on the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign in support of Palestine (Bond 2019), and reaffirming the democratic norms of “dissent and disruption” (Huq and Mochida 2018). While any of these prescriptions are not necessarily objectionable in their own right, a thoroughgoing and radical critique of ecofascism would be lost if it did not take as its starting point the logics that give rise to ecofascism, rather than the most proximate and concerning contemporary symptoms. For this reason, we now formulate our own conception of ecofascism, seeking to describe it in its foundational logics and conditions of possibility.

A Terrific Boomerang: Ecofascism and the Racial Capitalocene

Instead of treating ecofascism as some unique new threat looming over the horizon, we begin by looking to accounts of the historical conditions of possibility for fascism as such. Here, we turn to Martinican post-colonial poet and philosopher Aimé Césaire’s conception of fascism as a “terrific boomerang”: that the European fascism exemplified by the Holocaust is no aberration from Western notions of historical progress, but rather the culmination of the dehumanisation, extractivism, and genocidal violence constitutive of the colonial project beginning in 1492. From the viewpoint of European colonisers, these logics only become

legible as fascism when they facilitate genocide in the colonial core; the racialised extermination in the colonies in service of the development of modern capitalism fails to register as those same fascist logics. Here, Césaire (2000:36) is worth quoting in full:

And then one fine day the bourgeoisie is awakened by a terrific boomerang effect: the gestapos are busy, the prisons fill up, the torturers standing around the racks invent, refine, discuss. People are surprised, they become indignant. They say: "How strange! But never mind—it's Nazism, it will pass!" And they wait, and they hope; and they hide the truth from themselves, that it is barbarism, the supreme barbarism, the crowning barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarisms; that it is Nazism, yes, but that before they were its victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that before engulfing the whole edifice of Western, Christian civilization in its reddened waters, it oozes, seeps, and trickles from every crack.

Thus, fascism cannot be understood without grounding its conditions of possibility in the motivating logics of colonialism.

Césaire (2000:42) articulates the core continuity between colonisation and fascism by defining the former as *thingification*: "[n]o human contact, but relations of domination and submission which turn the colonizing man into a classroom monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the indigenous man into an instrument of production". For Césaire, thingification includes the familiar capitalist commodification of nature into so many resources ready for extraction, but also includes the commodification of humans along racial lines. Whereas the coloniser becomes their function in the colonial relations of production, Black and brown colonised people become *objects*, placing them in ontological proximity to the natural resources harvested and exploited by Europe. Val Plumwood (1991) and Carolyn Merchant (1980) extend Césaire's analysis to gender: the thingification of nature also feminises it, such that its commodification and subsequent exploitation can be legible as masculine conquest. Unsurprisingly, within the framework of masculine control over feminised nature, Indigenous women were enslaved, assaulted, or killed because their femininity aligned them all the more closely with the now-feminised, non-human world. As Maria Lugones (2010) explains, this proximity to nature stripped colonised women of their distinctly human gender—all they had left was sex. In this way, the gendered dynamics of thingification rendered colonised *women* into colonised *females*, thereby justifying and facilitating their use and destruction as non-humans.

Césaire thus instructs us to identify the dehumanisation at the heart of fascism as none other than the colonial logic of "thingification", which seeks to equate colonised people with nature so as to exploit and dispose of them as non-human nature, rather than as humans. This much is obvious in the minds of the colonisers themselves at the time: Christopher Columbus' 1493 letter to Luis de Santángel detailing his "discovery" of Hispaniola vacillates rapidly between a rapturous

inventory of the natural resources he intends to take or exploit (the hills, soil, rivers, trees, fruits, plants, the “many spiceries” and “great mines of gold and other metals...”) and his descriptions of the Indigenous population that place them in ontological proximity to non-human nature (those “most timorous creatures” who “eat human flesh”).⁴ Tying this sort of dehumanisation to the commodification at the heart of colonisation, Césaire (2000:37) writes: “At the end of capitalism, which is eager to outlive its day, there is Hitler.” In this way, Césaire’s (2000:41) claim that “the colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as *an animal*” is borne out in the dehumanisation of Auschwitz.

Thus, Césaire provides us with a theoretical framework within which to understand fascism: that its requisite dehumanisation relies on a combination of a commodified relationship to nature *and* the construction of categories of race and gender that place people in proximity to that nature so as to exploit or destroy them. Césaire was far from alone in identifying this logic: Pan-Africanist author George Padmore (1936) predates Césaire in identifying settler colonialism as the precursor to fascism in Europe, calling South Africa “the world’s classic Fascist state”. Likewise, Jewish Tunisian essayist Albert Memmi, Guyanese historian Walter Rodney, and African American poets Amiri Baraka and Langston Hughes all identified what Césaire called the boomerang effect in action.⁵ On these grounds, then, Césaire’s analysis illuminates two crucial points: one explicitly and the other implicitly. The former is that fascism is traceable back to the logics of colonialism, and cannot be properly understood as an aberration from contemporary notions of progress. The latter is that what he identifies as fascism already exhibits the core elements of what is currently called ecofascism. While Césaire wrote long before the terminology of ecofascism became an object of scholarly analysis, the implicit connections between these colonial logics and environmental violence have been taken up and fleshed out by thinkers working in the framework of the “racial capitalocene”.

Writing in response to the “Anthropocene”⁶ framework’s claim that humanity as a whole is culpable for climate change, Françoise Vergès (2017:73) asks: “what methodology is needed to write a history of the environment that includes slavery, colonialism, imperialism and racial capitalism, from the standpoint of those who were made into ‘cheap’ objects of commerce, their bodies as objects renewable through wars, capture, and enslavement, fabricated as disposable people, whose lives do not matter?” To answer this challenge, the racial capitalocene framework (Saldanha 2020; van Ryneveld and Islar 2023) places environmental violence into its proper historical, material, and racial context.⁷ Like Césaire, these thinkers seek to confront these harms by tracing their conditions of possibility back to their roots; Jason W. Moore (2015:175), for instance, explains that “to locate the origins of the modern world with the rise of capitalist civilization after 1450, with its audacious strategies of global conquest, endless commodification, and relentless rationalization, is to *prioritize the relations of power, capital, and nature that rendered fossil capitalism so deadly in the first place*” (emphasis added). Here, Césaire’s conception of colonisation as “thingification” connects the logics internal to colonisation directly to modern environmental violence: the

denigration of colonised humanity through race to the level of non-human—and at times inanimate—nature for the sake of exploitation (that the “enslaved are coded in parallel with material extraction under the guise of exchange” [Yusoff 2018:32]) is a precondition for *continued* violence along precisely those same logics. Thus, according to Farhana Sultana (2022:4), “some lives and ecosystems are rendered disposable and sacrificial, whereby structural forces, both historical and contemporary, fuel it”. In this way, zones of plunder can also be rendered zones of pollution under the same thing-ified logic: Kathryn Yusoff (2018:48) writes that “the disposal of wastes mobilizes a new frontierism in the designation of sacrifice zones within and beyond national borders that aggregates environmental harms with anti-Blackness”.

It should not be surprising, then, that the racial capitalocene framework conceptualises environmental harms as what Sultana (2022:4) calls “the unbearable heaviness of *climate coloniality*”, which “occurs where Eurocentric hegemony, neo-colonialism, racial capitalism, uneven consumption, and military domination are co-constitutive of climate impacts experienced by variously racialised populations who are disproportionately made vulnerable and disposable”. Crucially, environmental destruction is legible as climate coloniality because it is structured and made possible by those colonial categories in the first place. In Kyle Whyte’s (2017:153–154) formulation, “anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change is an *intensification* of environmental change imposed upon Indigenous peoples by colonialism”.

This intertwining of violence with nature/the environment connects multiple instances of genocidal destruction. After the initial colonial genocide of Indigenous peoples in the Americas during the long 16th century (which decimated the population from 54 million in 1492 to approximately six million in 1650) we can likewise identify the strategic use of race to naturalise and therefore dehumanise people in—among many others—the later “Manifest Destiny” period of expulsion and genocide of North American Indigenous populations (Cronon 1996; Moore and Roberts 2022), the mass death of Indigenous people as a result of silver mining and mercury poisoning in the Andes (Robins 2011), and, of course, the claims to blood and soil that ended the lives of millions in the Holocaust. In each of these cases, the environment is not incidental to the genocidal violence, but rather foundational: dehumanisation through categories of race is only possible if those categories place their target closer in proximity to non-human nature, which justifies the racialised subjects’ exploitation (if they are conceived of as a profitable object) or destruction (if they are conceived of as an impediment to some other end). Moreover, and in combination with the propertarian conception of land inherent to the construction of the modern nation-state, the colonial logics that facilitate genocidal violence bind some races to land by virtue of their ontological distance from it (e.g. the Aryan race may have a *Lebensraum* because it sufficiently dominates nature) while expelling others by virtue of their ontological proximity to it (e.g. Indigenous people cannot retain their land because they are simultaneously animalistic and insufficiently industrious to keep it). In this context, the continuity of ecological tactics in genocidal violence is particularly striking: because victims are dehumanised and relegated to animality, warfare

techniques that target their intersections with and reliance on nature are commonplace. General Sherman's extermination of 30 million buffalo as part of his campaign to starve the Plains Indians in the 19th century ("Kill every buffalo you can! Every buffalo dead is an Indian gone") and the Israeli Army's continued campaign of felling olive trees and killing livestock to remove Palestinians from the West Bank⁸ and Gaza⁹ are united in their reliance on the violent logics detailed above.

These intertwining colonial definitions of race and nature—which Césaire so helpfully illuminated at once in his description of thingification—are central to the ideological contents of what is currently called ecofascism. Thus, both the "great replacement" narrative parroted by ecofascist shooters and the xenophobic immigration policies currently being entertained by the European far-right are only possible in the broader context of climate colonialism, which itself originates from the intertwining of race, nature, and capitalism at the heart of 16th century colonialism. After all, blood and soil as an ideology did not simply appear from nowhere, in much the same way that the contemporary intersection of racist violence and climate harm is no mere accident. Rather, that connection betrays a long history that spans back further than any of the genealogical accounts of ecofascism described above.

Even though those working in the framework of the racial capitalocene largely do not engage with the terminology of ecofascism in a sustained way, reading their insights alongside Césaire's analysis of fascism provides us with significant theoretical purchase. However, crudely reifying Césaire's boomerang metaphor into a singular historical teleology or neat path out into the periphery and back inevitably invites counterexamples. To be sure, processes required for the expansion of racial capitalism also occur *within* the colonial core, such as the wave of enclosures in England during the long 16th century (Linebaugh 2014; Polanyi 2001) or the racialised expropriation of the Irish by the British in the 19th century (Go 2024). Likewise, fascistic racial nationalism can appear outside of the neat "core/periphery" binary between different groups within the periphery, such as in the far-right Hindutva movement in India (Leidig 2020; Patnaik 1993). In Go's (2023:19) words, "sometimes the boomerang returns, sometimes it does not, and we have not yet cottoned to why. Nor have we mapped the different routes by which it might return". We therefore locate the power of Césaire's boomerang thesis not in its rigid descriptive application, but rather in that it clarifies the continuities between these instances and the violence of climate colonialism described above by foregrounding their shared conditions of possibility: the process of "thingification" unites the Grotian logic of enclosure at work in the core with the primitive accumulation happening in the colonies, and the categories of race that emerged through this process are the same that were at work in Ireland and India.¹⁰

What's more, in this light, Césaire's boomerang effect is doubly insightful when applied to ecofascism: not only does it help situate ecofascism in the broader context of climate coloniality but it also reminds us that climate coloniality will only be described as ecofascism once it becomes visible to the colonial core, offering us a geography of legibility crucial to properly understanding ecofascism. Thus,

connecting ecofascism to the logics of colonialism and Césaire's boomerang effect allows us to conceive of ecofascism in terms of its own logics and conditions of possibility, rather than relying on historical analogy or resemblance (and, ironically, rendering ecofascism ahistorical). For this reason, our goal is not necessarily to dispatch the four extant scholarly genealogies above but rather to understand them in the context of their underlying logics. They may all tell stories that are useful to our understanding of ecofascism today, but our intent is to bring attention to the conditions that render those historical contingencies and genealogies both possible *and* legible.

While we highlighted the descriptive discrepancies between various accounts of eco-fascism above, the more important tensions were theoretical: where does ecofascism stem from, and what is the relationship between the "eco" and the "fascism"? If, however, we interrogate ecofascism in the context of colonisation and the racial capitalocene, we find that fascism has *always* relied on colonial ecology; both race and nature were and continue to be defined in strategically overlapping ways that bolster the project of colonisation. This means, then, that the "eco" portion of ecofascism should not refer to justifications grounded in the climate change made so apparent in the last few decades. While we agree with the racial capitalocene literature that the current climate crisis is inseparable from colonialism and its legacies, we maintain that the strategic definition of nature has *always* played a part in justifying genocidal violence. A warming world is not the cause of ecofascism, but rather both a consequence and exacerbator of it.

In light of these connections, our analysis implies that we *could* treat the relationship of ecology to fascism in the same way that theorists like Cedric Robinson and W.E.B. Du Bois treat the relationship of race to fascism: the term "racial fascism" is redundant because race is a precondition for fascism, rather than merely one of the vectors along which it structures itself at its most violent. As Robinson (2019:152) explains, like Césaire, fascism "was and is a modern social discipline which much like its genetic predecessors, Christianity, imperialism, nationalism, sexism, and racism, provided the means for the ascent to and presentation of power for elitists". Despite this theoretical redundancy, scholars such as Alberto Toscano (2023) intentionally invoke the category of racial fascism precisely because these racial preconditions have often been ignored or overlooked. In much the same way, while in our analysis fascism is so deeply inextricable from ecological categories via their intertwined origins in colonialism that the term ecofascism is likewise theoretically repetitive, we do not necessarily suggest disposing of the terminology of ecofascism *in toto*. We should, instead, reconceive it.

Césaire's account of fascism in the context of the racial capitalocene thus guides our recontextualisation of ecofascism: what is today being called ecofascism is no new phenomenon, but rather the culmination of the colonial logics of extractivism, dehumanisation, and racialised violence finally made legible to and felt by the colonial core. This approach unmasks the racial project of the contemporary far-right *and* the climate coloniality facilitated by green capitalism as no more than the colonial project spread out over temporal and spatial distance. Thus, when un-interrogated the "eco" of ecofascism functions as a red herring: it is invoked as a way to articulate *some* ecologically motivated violence, often from the viewpoint of

how the climate crisis is experienced by the Global North. As we argued above, this narrow definition obscures more than it illuminates, disqualifying numerous instances of ecologically motivated violence and providing shaky ground on which to administer prescriptions. In our view, however, invoking a radical and broader conception of ecofascism serves a practical purpose: because ecofascism is a contemporary object of both scholarly curiosity and justified public anxiety, re-conceiving the concept allows us to clarify that there is an intimate relationship between ecology and fascism, widen the scope of what is identified as fascist violence, and make sense of the kinds of tactics used in genocidal violence.

We then have the ability to locate colonial logics as the connective tissue between the structural and ideological components of ecofascism. An illustrative example of this intersection is the mid-20th century “population control” discourse and its subsidiary institutions and policies. Extending the colonial categories and already-violent prescriptions of Thomas Malthus’ (1798) *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (which Friedrich Engels [1844] described as “the crudest, most barbarous theory that ever existed”), Paul Ehrlich’s (1968) *The Population Bomb* likewise suggested either lowering the birth rate or increasing the death rate as ways to combat “overpopulation” and a resultant hypothesised lack of food. Ehrlich’s recommendations consistently rely on colonial categories of race and propertied territory: overpopulation meant an increasing population in Global South countries, which must be kept out of Western and Global North countries at all costs. Despite his having been exposed to questions of population in the progressive-leaning Sierra Club, his policy visions could easily be mistaken for a contemporary European far-right party’s immigration policy: “The bedrock requirement of the program would have to be population control, necessarily including migration control to prevent swamping of aided areas by the less fortunate” (Ehrlich 1968:148). The very same year, fellow neo-Malthusian Garrett Hardin (1968) published the now-ubiquitous “Tragedy of the Commons” in *Science*, which likewise raised alarms about the effects of “overpopulation” on natural resources. Similarly fearing “over-breeding”, the implicit target of his concerns became explicit in the context of his life: Hardin unsurprisingly embraced anti-immigration policy, became a member and eventual director of the American Eugenics Society, and was ultimately associated with white nationalism by the Southern Poverty Law Center.¹¹

Far from being lone ideologues, Ehrlich’s and Hardin’s articulation of “population control” as a framework gained significant momentum: it inspired widespread social movements such as Zero Population Growth (ZPG) and garnered endorsements from notable environmentalists, activists, and businessmen such as David Attenborough, Jacques Cousteau, Jane Goodall, John D. Rockefeller, and Margaret Sanger, among others. Matthew Connolly (2008) relays a particular instance of such measures that relies on and forcefully invokes colonial asymmetries of power: in 1962, the (American funded and run) Population Council experimented with distributing oral contraceptives to rural women in India and Pakistan and, when faced with their understandable non-compliance, pivoted to targeted insertion of IUDs. As Alan Guttmacher, figurehead of the Population Council, put it: “No contraceptive could be cheaper, and also, once the damn thing is in the patient cannot change her

mind. In fact, we can hope she will forget it's there and perhaps in several months wonder why she has not conceived" (Connolly 2008:205). Demonstrating that the effects of the colonial boomerang reverberated beyond the core, the zero-growth framework was eventually institutionalised in the form of national-level policies across numerous countries, among them Indira Gandhi's Emergency Rule in India (in which 6.2 million men were sterilised at the outset in 1976, shifting toward some 4.5 million women sterilised annually as recently as 2014 [Chung et al. 2022]) and China's One Child Policy (resulting in some 108 million women being sterilised between 1980 and 2014 [Greenhalgh 2005]).

In this way, the population control movement and the intertwined American eugenics movement (which played its own part in the Holocaust after travelling across the Atlantic) did not give rise to contemporary ecofascism *sui generis*, but instead relied on precisely the categories that Césaire isolates in colonialism: a dehumanising racism, a license to exterminate the animalistic Indigenous Other, and an uncontested claim to land for use as the coloniser sees fit. Because these logics form the interconnection between environmentalists calling for racist population control and self-proclaimed ecofascists lamenting the "Great Replacement", the question of whether ecofascists are environmentalists with a fascist streak or fascists with an environmentalist streak is rendered moot. Rather, *both* liberal population control schemes and flashpoints of ecofascist violence are only possible within the context of colonialism and its inherent intertwining of race and ecology.

Even though Moore and Roberts (2022:124) explicitly reject Césaire's boomerang thesis in their book-length treatment of ecofascism, arguing that "contemporary colonial geographies are now much more complex", we contend that the racial capitalocene and climate coloniality as articulated by Yusoff, Vergès, Sultana, Whyte, and numerous others still indispensably illuminate why *some* people's lives and land are devalued and destroyed, while *other* people's lives and land have yet to experience such violence. Whereas these connections can be obscured by quantifiable measures of capitalistic progress—for Césaire, tonnage of cotton and mileage of railroad tracks, and for contemporary neoliberals the "VSL" or value of a statistical life in the carbon market economy (Buller 2022:50)—the fact that the effects of these measures reliably harm the same populations and predictably benefit others reveals their hidden continuity.

Our conception of ecofascism, then, does not disqualify the actions and actors above from being called ecofascist, but instead insists that the various forms and instances of ecologically justified genocidal violence that are currently classified under climate colonialism (if they are mentioned at all) must *also* be identified as ecofascist, insofar as they rely on the same colonial categories. If contemporary ecofascism and National Socialism were about blood and soil, so too were the deaths of millions of victims of colonisation, past and present.

Avoiding the Re-Creation of the White Man's Burden: Anti-Ecofascist Praxis

Understanding ecofascism in the context of Césaire's boomerang effect also helps us to understand why those who work within the racial capitalocene framework—

and those who do post- and decolonial theory generally—largely do not address “ecofascism” as it appears in the literature above, and subsequently do not offer specific prescriptions to counter it. If a (potentially subconscious) condition of ecofascism’s legibility to Western scholars is that the harms identified as ecofascism occur in the Global North, the racial capitalocene’s understanding of environmental violence de-fetishises those specific flashpoints and places them within a broader framework of violent colonial legacies. Here, Potawatomi scholar and environmental theorist Kyle Whyte’s writing on Indigenous climate change studies is illustrative; Whyte critiques the Anthropocene framework for articulating irreversible devastation of the global climate as an *impending* crisis. This disposition manifests itself in a temporality that locates climate catastrophe as an apocalypse to be avoided or mitigated before its arrival. Only within this discursive world can the categories of “post-apocalyptic” and “dystopia” function as registers of speculative fiction. For Whyte (2018:226), however, “we [Indigenous peoples] confront climate change having already passed through environmental and climate crises arising from the impacts of colonialism”. Put differently, the “post-apocalyptic” is a register of fictional futurity available only to those who have not yet experienced apocalypse. In much the same way, Kathryn Yusoff (2018:12–13) invokes both science fiction writer N.K. Jemisin and scholar Saidiya Hartman to convey that “the end of this world has already happened for some subjects, and it is the prerequisite for the possibility of imagining ‘living and breathing again’ for others”. In the context of our discussion of ecofascism, then, the articulations of ecofascism that place it into an emergent or future temporal register rely on the disqualification of theoretically equivalent violence spanning the last half millennia. On the other hand, ecofascism understood in the context of the racial capitalocene is violent colonial business as usual, and deserves to be met with precisely the same modes of praxis that decolonial and racial capitalocene thinkers have been offering all along.

For this reason, those worried about the self-identified ecofascist actions detailed above must shift the focus of their praxes. Prescriptions that exist within or fail to contest green capitalism (e.g. such as economic sanction regimes, recommitment to democratic norms, and so on) leave intact the material relations under which climate coloniality and genocidal violence worthy of the name ecofascism occur.¹² In the same way, prescriptions that do not directly challenge the global distribution of power (e.g. reliance on international courts, etc.) fail to interrupt longstanding colonial relationships of extraction and dependency. Our critiques here resemble in many ways the racial capitalocene framework’s critiques of the Anthropocene framework: that to adopt an ostensible view from nowhere in which to raise the alarm about a narrow set of contemporary actions is to erase histories of racism and at the same time attempt to reclaim historical innocence (Mignolo 2009; Yusoff 2018). As Yusoff (2018:18) clarifies, “[i]f the Anthropocene is viewed as a resurrection of the impulse to reestablish humanism in all its exclusionary terms of universality, then any critical theory that does not work with and alongside black and indigenous studies (rather than in an extractive or supplementary mode) will fail to deliver any epochal shift at all”. Thus, responding to ecofascism as if it is a set of actions and actors unconnected from legacies of

specifically colonial racism, extraction, and environmental destruction fails in at least three ways: such approaches do not address anywhere near all of the actions or events that *should* be identified as ecofascism, they concern themselves with the violent symptoms rather than their causes or conditions of possibility, and they potentially work within or even perpetuate the epistemological and material conditions of ecofascism's existence. A failure to link ecofascism to colonialism then risks centring white futures "that 'de-future' racialised others which reinforces white supremacy" (Sultana 2022:8). Without a broader historical and material context, the prescriptions critiqued above are liable to articulate protections against the narrow definition of ecofascism as a new white man's burden: "a paternalism that is tied to a redemptive narrative of saving the world from harm on account of others while maintaining the protective thick skin of innocence" (Yusoff 2018:27).

In order to avoid recreating the conditions under which ecofascist violence—in the broad sense that we defined above—emerges, one's forms of resistance must be resolutely grounded in opposition to ecofascism's constituent logics: actions should be anti-imperialist, anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-capitalist, to start. Many such strategies sit at the intersection of these commitments, and resistance to the conditions of ecofascism may take radically different forms. Olúfemi O. Táiwò (2022) and David Myer Temin (2024b), for example, seek to redress climate coloniality through directly ameliorating the material inequities that facilitate harms along colonial dimensions of exploitation. On this view, a future-oriented conception of reparations (for Táiwò) or wages for earthwork (for Temin) creates the possibility of anti-colonial worldmaking in which new institutions and relationships between countries may emerge. Others recommend direct action. Andreas Malm's (2021) well known *How to Blow Up a Pipeline* suggests that property destruction must be utilised in order to disrupt and disincentivise global systems of extraction. For Lakota organiser and historian Nick Estes (2019), direct action looks like the sorts of occupations and protests that delayed the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline through the Standing Rock Reservation. And still yet others recommend forms of epistemic disobedience: engaging in actions that necessarily contest the colonial categories that facilitate ecofascism. Kyle Whyte relays a tradition of the Little River Band of Odawa Indians, who every year stage a public ceremony in which they release sturgeon back into the Michigan watershed because of their ecological and cultural importance to Indigenous folks there. This kind of ceremony celebrates a tradition that relies on human/non-human relations devalued by colonialism, as well as specific ecological knowledge that contests industrial colonial knowledge. Likewise, María José Méndez relates an act of epistemic disobedience which undercuts the simultaneous colonial denigration of non-human nature and Indigenous ways of knowing. To protest the construction of a dam in the Gualcarque River basin, she and fellow members of the Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH) swam in the river instead of resorting to the usual roadblocks, protests, sit-ins, and so on. Méndez (2018:20) explains the function of such epistemic confrontation: "I wonder if dwelling in moments of resonance that unsettle our ontological presuppositions might help us open slowly to an ethical encounter with the thick imaginary of subaltern groups".

Though each of the forms of resistance described above confronts various aspects of ecofascism's conditions of possibility in different and possibly conflicting ways, the stakes of mitigating an ever-heating world and avoiding ever more naked ecofascist violence demands strategies of resistance that could allow anti-ecofascists to converge regardless of their theoretical commitments or positionality. To this end, we take inspiration from what Temin (2024a:10) calls "worldly anticolonialism", in which anti-colonial and anti-capitalist strategies are reoriented around "compelling *political-economic* alternatives based on massive decarbonization". There will no doubt be disagreements between members of such an anti-ecofascist coalition—some even organised along some of ecofascism's axes of possibility. For this reason, the goal of such a strategy would be to imagine "more robust and compelling affinities, if not convergences, between projects of decolonization and decarbonization that would enhance the well-being of people and the planet" (ibid.). An anti-ecofascist future must be a compelling alternative for everyone—more compelling even than clinging to the dregs of privilege that come with defending those hierarchies of power that culminate in ecofascism. In this regard, anti-ecofascists need not share all the same commitments to work together to resist and overcome their shared causes of suffering; if the world is at stake, there is nothing to lose.

We have attempted to provide a framework in this article within which to connect the disjointed events popularly identified as ecofascist with those overlooked legacies of violence that should otherwise be included. Reading ecofascism through Césaire's boomerang effect and the racial capitalocene framework reveals the colonial origins of constructing categories of race which strategically place Black and brown people in proximity to nature so as to justify dehumanising, exploiting, and killing them. Genocidal violence, in other words, has always relied on justifications grounded in nature. If, then, we adopt Césaire's conception of fascism as the logics, techniques, and practices of colonialism come to roost in the colonial core, then ecofascism is likewise the culmination of colonialism's violent and strategic equivocation between race and nature. Our goal in offering this broader framework for understanding ecofascism is not to distract from the sorts of violent acts and xenophobic policies one might find in the headlines, but to decolonise our contemporary approaches to what it entails and how it might be resisted and overcome. As many of the thinkers cited above are wont to emphasise, instances of environmental violence that occur in the cores of historical colonial power are inseparable from the struggles that have unfolded across the rest of the world for centuries since colonisation. In Farhana Sultana's (2022:10) words, "colonialism haunts the past, present, and future through climate". A world without ecofascism, then, is a world that must be made entirely anew.

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Data Availability Statement

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

Endnotes

¹ The Christchurch shooter, Brenton Tarrant, explicitly uses the phrase “ethno-nationalist eco-fascist” to self-identify in his manifesto (Tarrant 2019:18), while the Buffalo shooter, Payton Gendron, opts for the longer “ethno-nationalist eco-fascist national socialist” (Gendron 2022:10). The El Paso shooter, Patrick Crusius, does not use the term in his manifesto, but is reported to have used the phrase in other online communications. Nevertheless, he opens the document with a declaration of support for the Christchurch shooter, justifies his attack on the basis of the environment (“the decimation of the environment is creating a massive burden for future generations”) and invokes a race-based future that will curtail immigration and its ostensible degradation or dilution of white America (see Ehsan and Stott 2020).

² These policies are listed and analysed by Andreas Malm and the Zetkin Collective (2021).

³ An exception is McDonald (2020).

⁴ See Columbus (1893).

⁵ See Chapter 2 of Toscano (2023) for an overview of thinkers who likewise identified Césaire’s boomerang effect.

⁶ For example, Dryzek and Pickering (2018). For further critiques, see Stratford et al. (2023).

⁷ Specifically, the racial capitalocene framework claims that the environmental crisis is principally caused by racial capitalism. In relying on the racial capitalocene framework, we adopt a specific understanding of racial capitalism articulated by Julian Go (2024:A2). His “contingency-contextual” approach “proposes that racial capitalism is an existing form of capitalism wherein key components in the circuits of capital—production, the market and finance—are racialized. It is a system whereby racial meanings make sense of, structure and legitimate the hierarchy of labor in production, the subsequent differential valuation of commodities in the market, and financial centralization. Race thus serves as a contingent construction by which capitalism’s inequalities are structured and legitimated”. This framework does not make the universalist claim that capitalism and racial inequality are *everywhere* intertwined in the same way and to the same degree, nor does it claim that capitalism could only have developed through racial oppression or inequality. Instead, it posits that capitalism and racial inequality are connected but that there are variations in whether there is a connection and the degree, kind, and form of that connection. Likewise, Go’s (2024:A5) account claims that capitalism emerged through and with racial oppression and inequality for accidental and historical reasons. Following Go’s framework, on which we base our own reading of the racial capitalocene, capitalism’s intertwinement with race in the context of colonialism is interconnected but decidedly uneven: the transition from European feudalism to capitalism that occurs in and through colonialism is facilitated by the creation of a racialised distinction amongst the burgeoning proletariat between the exploited and the expropriated—what Du Bois calls the “global color line” (see also Satgar 2021a). At the same time, instances of capitalist domination can occur within the context of racial capitalism that do not mobilise race to exclusively nakedly exploitative ends (what Nancy Fraser [2019] calls “progressive neoliberalism”, wherein wealthy individuals from historically exploited groups are celebrated in order to distract from continuing

structural racial inequality) or as a primary vector of domination (as in the French economy in the 18th or 19th centuries).

⁸ See Braverman (2009) for an extended analysis of Palestinian cultivation of olive trees as an act of resistance to Israeli occupation, further clarifying the intersection of domination and ecological destruction.

⁹ See Hughes et al. (2023). For news coverage prior to 7 October 2023, see Frykberg (2015), and for coverage detailing the ongoing tactics, see Alsaafin and Amer (2023).

¹⁰ At the same time, we focus on “conditions of possibility” so as not to condemn *everything* after 1492 as ecofascist. We can therefore talk about ecofascism as in or out of power, or as taking on an incipient counterrevolutionary form (as in Angela Y. Davis’ [2016] view).

¹¹ See <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/garrett-hardin> (last accessed 15 January 2025).

¹² See Buller (2022) for a detailed critique of green capitalism.

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